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KARL JASPERS: THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 
STUDY GUIDE, 1977 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
           After the Second World War, the murderous events of the first half of the 
twentieth century lent renewed energy to international efforts to define and 
protect human rights.  One contribution to this literature, which addressed the 
question of the collective responsibility for the German people for the criminal 
actions of their government, was a brief book simply entitled Die Schuldfrage 
[The Guilt Question] by the German physician, psychiatrist, and existentialist 
philosopher Karl Jaspers.  Jaspers, whose wife was Jewish and who hid Jews 
from the authorities, distinguished between four types of guilt: 
Criminal guilt comes of violating unequivocal laws and is capable of 
objective proof.  Jurisdiction rests with the court. 
   Political guilt involves the deeds of statesmen and implicates the citizens 
of a state for “having to bear the consequences of the deeds of the state whose 
power governs [them] and under whose order [they] live.”  Jurisdiction rests 
with the power and will of the victor if the state should be defeated militarily.  The 
exercise of political prudence serves to mitigate arbitrary power. 
Then there is moral guilt: “I, who cannot act otherwise than as an 
individual, am morally responsible for all my deeds, including the execution of 
political and military orders.  It is never simply true that ‘orders are orders.’”  
“Jurisdiction rests with my conscience, and in communication with my friends and 
intimates who lovingly concerned about my soul.”  This is why it is always 
important to have wise counsel at hand. 
 Jaspers’ last category, metaphysical guilt, is a little more troubling if 
taken to an extreme.  It owes more to the Hindu concept of karma than to 
Christianity to the extent it neglects to consider the irreducible reality of sin and 
the crucial importance of divine forgiveness.  But still it makes a sound point: 
“There exists a solidarity among men as humans that makes each co-responsible 
for every wrong and every injustice in the world [this confuses man the creature 
with God], especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge.  
If I fail whatever I can do to prevent them, I too am guilty.” 
This last point merits further consideration.  It can easily lead to a 
sanctimonious political moralism that has often been used to justify acts of 
terrorism, such as the bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma City or 
the murder of an abortionist in Pensacola.  It may also lead to a conception of 
war as a crusade that requires unconditional surrender by the enemy.  Among its 
tools are the arts of guilt-manipulation, which are addressed at length by R. J. 
Rushdoony (The Politics of Guilt and Pity), who squarely confronts the 
temptations of self-atonement and scapegoating. 
Often this kind of moralism substitutes a false idealism for the prudence or 
compassion that would spare even an enemy from unnecessary harm.  John 
Brown’s use of terrorism against Southern settlers in the Pottawatomie Massacre 
is just one of many examples.  It has a psychological aspect – a sense of guilt by 
association – that may cause us to abhor the consciousness of injustice in our 
midst and seek to purge it by  correcting it or, sometimes, by wreaking 
vengeance.  The American movie industry seems to specialize in fantasies 
of retribution for guilty consciences. 
Self-justification takes a variety of forms.  Sometimes we are in a position 
to act and regret that we did not do so sooner, like the high school student in 
West Paducah, Kentucky who talked a school mate into surrendering his gun 
after he had already killed three students.  Such circumstances may cause 
us to wrestle with our consciences and even lead us to unrealistically magnify our 
own role or responsibility.  We must remember that we are not all-seeing.  
Sometimes we simply react to a crisis on the basis of instinct or prior experience.  
For Jaspers metaphysical guilt results from confining our solidarity to the closest 
human ties -- family, friends, neighbors – rather than extending it to all mankind.  
It suffers from a lack of proportion.  Here the parable of the Good Samaritan is 
helpful because it teaches compassion for the real people we encounter rather 
than the kind of abstract philanthropy which costs nothing and accomplishes 
little more.  The concept of metaphysical guilt can too easily be used as a 
political tool by people to extort benefits from others or avoid accepting personal 
responsibility. 
In the end Jaspers himself acknowledges that jurisdiction over 
metaphysical guilt lies with God alone.  It is a disturbing and easily abused 
concept but it reminds us of the subtle ways in which our lives are entangled – 
and how we may unknowingly (and sometimes knowingly) profit from the 
sufferings of others. 
